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7 May 2025: Political tensions rise as PC issues decrees designed to undermine the HoR’s authority

7 May 2025: Political tensions rise as PC issues decrees designed to undermine the HoR’s authority

This week we look at the PC's latest controversial decrees, as well as reports of US plans to deport migrants to Libya and Dabaiba's moves to rationalise hard currency in the oil sector.

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May 07, 2025
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7 May 2025: Political tensions rise as PC issues decrees designed to undermine the HoR’s authority
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Political tensions rise as PC issues decrees & instructions designed to undermine the HoR’s authority; Saleh pushes ahead with new government efforts

Incident: The Presidential Council (PC) issued a series of decrees and instructions this week including suspending the House of Representatives’ (HoR) Supreme Constitutional Court and instructing the HoR to submit all its legislation for review by the PC.

On 29 May, the PC issued three decrees. The first suspended the effects of the HoR Law No. 5 of 2023 establishing a Supreme Constitutional Court ‘due to the unconstitutionality of the law according to the ruling of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court.’

The second decree said that each municipal council shall have a ‘member for national reconciliation’ who shall be ‘elected from the list of election officials in all municipalities.’ The national reconciliation members will be responsible for supervising national reconciliation programmes implemented by the Supreme National Reconciliation Commission, established pursuant to PC Resolution No. 5 of 2021, among other things.

The third decree outlined the duties of the National Commission for Referendum and National Enquiry and appointed the Board of Directors for the Commission. It shall be responsible for all aspects of the national referendum, including the authority to issue the executive regulations and procedures necessary to implement the referendum process and register citizens, as well as the process of distributing referendum centres according to the electoral districts approved in accordance with the legislation in force. Notably, the decree said that the topics requiring a referendum process shall be determined, and its results shall be approved by, the Chairman of the Presidential Council.

In addition, on 1 May a letter was circulated on social media from PC head Muhammed al-Menfi to the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) head Emad al-Sayeh giving the latter a 30-day deadline to hold a referendum on the draft constitution prepared by the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA).

On 5 May, Menfi wrote a letter to the HoR instructing it to refer all the laws it has passed since 15 March 2021 – which is when Menfi took up his position - to the PC for review. Menfi said that such laws should only be promulgated if they align with the political agreement and are practically implementable by state institutions. He criticized laws signed off solely by the HoR Speaker as violations of both established norms and the Constitutional Declaration. Menfi emphasized that since the establishment of modern Libya under the 1951 Constitution, the issuance of laws has always been a function of the executive authority, specifically the head of state.

The PC decrees have provoked significant controversy and backlash from many Libyan actors, though others have given the PC their support.

PC Deputy Abdullah al-Lafi said that there was not consensus within the PC on these decisions, claiming that ‘issuing decrees requires a collective decision; it cannot be done unilaterally.’ As such, al-Lafi said these decrees have ‘no constitutional or legal impact, and are tantamount to being null and void.’

On 29 May, HoR Speaker Aqeela Saleh issued a formal response to the PC’s decrees, stressing that the legislative authority [the HoR] is the only body responsible for issuing laws and noting that the PC decrees are an ‘encroachment’ on the legislature and are therefore void. Saleh reiterated that the Supreme Constitutional Court comes within the framework of ‘the legislature’s desire for a specialised judiciary concerned with monitoring the constitutionality of laws.’ The Government of National Stability (GNS) also rejected the PC’s decrees as illegitimate.

On 3 May, during a televised statement addressed to the people of Khoms where a meeting of the (HoR-formed) National Reconciliation Forum had been due to take place before it was disrupted by Misratan militias, Saleh reiterated his condemnation of the PC and its decrees, stressing there is no legal or constitutional basis for them. He also called for the formation of a new unified government as soon as possible, based on the political agreement through consensus between the HoR and the High State Council (HSC).

On 4 May, Menfi was welcomed back to Tripoli with a high-level formal reception at Mitiga Airport after being abroad for several days receiving medical treatment. GNU PM Abdul Hameed Dabaiba was in attendance, along with Abdullah al-Lafi, several high-ranking military and intelligence personnel, several ministers, mayors and elders. In a speech at the reception, PM Dabaiba gave his support to the PC decrees, saying they are ‘a step towards restoring Libya's strength and unity,’ indicating his government's determination to implement them. He also condemned Saleh’s attempts to move ahead with a new government, saying they only serve to extend the transitional period and delay elections.

UNSMIL has indirectly condemned the PC’s moves, with warnings against unilateral actions, as well as announcing that the Advisory Committee has concluded its recommendations.

On 30 April, UNSMIL said it was ‘concerned about recent political and security developments and warns against the risk of escalatory unilateral actions by political and security actors.’ It called on ‘on all political and security actors to refrain from taking steps that could jeopardize the process of consultation and compromise the fragile peace and stability of the country.’ However, no names or specifics were given. The US Embassy also gave its backing to these comments, stressing the need for a consensus around a path to elections.

On 2 May, UNSMIL said that the Advisory Committee had concluded its deliberations the day before and ‘finalized a set of options to address contentious issues in Libya’s current electoral framework.’ It said final edits are being made to the report and that UNSMIL will publish the options as proposed by the AC ‘in due course.’ UNSMIL said the options ‘will be a useful contribution towards securing political agreement for the holding of national elections and unifying state institutions’. As a next step, it will ‘assess the options outlined in the report and begin consultations with Libyan stakeholders and the wider public on a consensus-based political roadmap towards reaching elections.

Comment: In September 2024, Menfi issued PC President Decision No.26 of 2024 forming the Board of Directors of the National Commission for Referendum and National Inquiry, following its initial establishment of the commission in August. However, this was challenged by Abdullah al-Lafi as it was issued unilaterally by Menfi. It seems the aim of this new commission is to hold a referendum on whether the HoR and HSC should be dissolved given their failures to complete their duties over the last decade. As highlighted in Decree No.3, its responsibilities clash directly with those of HNEC.

In early January 2025, the HoR passed a National Reconciliation Law sparking anger from Menfi who stressed that the PC had produced a draft national reconciliation law which received international praise before it was referred to the HoR over a year before. Under the LPA, the PC is responsible for overseeing national reconciliation, though its efforts (supported by the African Union) to create a national process have so far failed. In addition, in November 2024, the HoR launched a National Reconciliation Forum in Benghazi, led by al-Siddiq Khalifa Haftar - one of Haftar’s sons who has been earmarked by the family as a presidential candidate.

The PC and HoR – specifically Menfi and Saleh - have been in a tussle over the Constitutional Court, the national reconciliation process, and the referendum process for several years now with both wanting to use the levers of the judiciary and the electoral infrastructure to further their own political aims and protect their positions. In short, the HoR wants to protect the laws it has passed (notably the electoral laws) and prevent challenges to its authority (such as attempts to remove the HoR or its government via a referendum). Meanwhile the PC wants to hold a referendum, either on the draft constitution or on the legitimacy of the HoR and HSC, as a means to undermine or remove the HoR and its influence over any electoral process, and to protect the position of the GNU and the PC itself. Despite the revival of calls to hold a referendum on the draft constitution completed by the CDA in 2018, there were many issues and concerns around the final draft from both Libyan and international actors.

More recently, those who support the appointment of a new unified government prior to elections have become concerned that the outputs of the Advisory Committee, and the views of the new SRSG Hanna Tetteh, may mean that this requirement – which had been agreed under the 6+6 Committee process – may be revisited or removed.

Significance: As predicted, the conclusion of the Advisory Committee process and UNSMIL’s indication that a fresh phase of consultation is about to begin has kickstarted renewed efforts by competing Libyan actors to shape the political process so it meets their own interests. The PC’s decrees are just the latest volley in a long-lasting legislative battle between the PC and the HoR over who has the legal and constitutional right to take decisions about Libya’s future, and whether that involves the GNU remaining in power in the short term or not. The PC’s decrees are designed to give the PC the authority to hold a referendum and nullify constitutional challenges via the HoR’s Supreme Constitutional Court, as well reasserting control over the national referendum process via the municipal council elections. They are also designed to try to undermine the HoR’s position and credibility as the sole legislative authority. The PC is likely to issue additional decrees and decisions in this vein in the coming days and weeks.

It is very likely that the legality of these decrees will be challenged and it is unlikely that they will be fully implemented, if at all. Nevertheless, these decrees are likely to succeed in recharging the wider political debate over Libya’s next steps – reopening the debate about whether the appointment of a new government to oversee elections should be the next step in the political process or not. In response, Saleh and the HoR are likely to intensify their efforts to move ahead with agreeing a new government and will push hard to ensure that this is a key facet of any new political roadmap. These political divisions, disagreements and spoiler tactics are likely to intensify in the coming period, with an uptick likely once the AC’s recommendations are made public (or disclosed to key stakeholders) and once UNSMIL’s next steps (if they have any) are made clearer.

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US-Libya relations under the spotlight amid reports of US plan to send migrants to Libya, a Pentagon visit by Zoubi and Norland retiring

Incident: Reports that the US is planning to send migrants with criminal records from the US to Libya under a potential deal sparked outrage in Libya this week. On 30 April, CNN reported that the Trump administration has discussed with Libya and Rwanda the possibility of sending migrants who have criminal records and are in the United States to those two countries. In addition to sending migrants with criminal records, Trump officials are also hoping to enter formal negotiations with Libya to strike a so-called safe third country agreement, which would allow the US to send asylum seekers apprehended at the US border to Libya. No decision has been made yet, and it’s unclear which nationalities would be eligible.

Dabaiba meets NOC to discuss hard currency shortages, ending barter system and Arkenu; Stresses need for transparency in oil sector

Incident: On 29 April, PM Dabaiba held an expanded meeting at the National Oil Corporation (NOC) headquarters with acting NOC Chairman Masoud Suleiman, the NOC Board, acting Oil Minister (and NOC board member) Khalifa Abdul Sadiq, and head of the Audit Bureau Khaled Shakshak. The meeting was held to discuss ‘enhancing disclosure and adopting new measures to ensure transparency in oil sector contracts, as well as reducing the impact of parallel spending (by the eastern Libyan administration) on the value of the Libyan dinar’. The whole meeting was televised and live-streamed.

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Libya Security Monitor (LSM) is the flagship project of Libya-Analysis’ sister charity. It is a not-for-profit English-language repository of non-partisan, cross-checked information on security developments in Libya. It tracks the activities of Libya’s armed groups and political actors, the Islamic State’s offshoot in Libya as well as the other Libyan jihadi movements. The LSM is a valuable resource for governments, think-tanks, and businesses concerned with jihadi threats and their evolution in Libya.

For more information, please contact Rhiannon Smith, Managing Director, at Rhi@Libya-Analysis.com.


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