6 November 2024: UNSC renews UNSMIL mandate for only three months
This week we look at the renewal of UNSMIL's mandate, renewed tensions between the 444 Brigade and the Zintani PFG, and a further to boost to oil production even as rumours around NC7 contract swirl.
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UNSC renews UNSMIL mandate for only three months
Incident: UNSMIL’s position has been renewed for three-months, with internationals hoping to revive political dialogue in the short term.
On 31 October, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2755 (2024) extending the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for 3 months until 31 January 2025, with an automatic nine-month extension if a new Special Representative and Mission Head is appointed by that date. The new UN resolution reaffirms the legitimacy of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat in December 2015, as well as the road map approved by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum during its meetings in Tunisia in November 2020 and Geneva 2021, as well as the updated electoral laws prepared by the joint 6+6 committee of the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High State Council (HSC).
The UNSC urged ‘the Libyan political institutions and key stakeholders to resolve outstanding politically contentious issues pertaining to elections to progress a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned, UNSMIL-facilitated negotiation and deliver free, fair, transparent and inclusive national, presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible.’ It said there can be no military solution in Libya and demanded all Member States fully comply with the arms embargo ‘by ceasing all support for foreign fighters and mercenaries and withdrawing them.’
Following the vote, several delegates expressed concern over the prolonged vacancy in the position of Special Representative for Libya, while others debated the mandate renewal’s duration. Most members favoured a 12-month renewal ‘to allow the Mission to fully and smoothly carry out its mandate at this critical juncture.’ However, Russia insisted that UNSMIL requires ‘a leader that will be fully trusted by all parties,’ stressing that further delays are unacceptable. The US delegate voiced disappointment that negotiations did not result in a year-long renewal, citing Russia’s ‘intransigence’ during negotiations as ‘the sole reason we do not have a straightforward one-year renewal.’ He cautioned that revisiting the mandate every few months stalls progress towards sustainable solutions in the country.
Presidential Council (PC) head Muhammed al-Menfi welcomed the UNSC resolution, describing it as ‘an important roadmap and a turning point in Libya's history’ and stressing the need to respect the concluded agreements, address unilateral decisions, and establish financial arrangements to reach a unified budget that guarantees the independence and neutrality of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) and its technical role. Menfi stressed that linking the election laws to the 6+6 Committee as a basis, and holding a popular referendum to end the political stalemate, represents a real path to achieving elections.
HoR Speaker Aqeela Saleh also welcomed the UNSC Resolution, emphasizing the importance of the Security Council’s support for Libya’s political process to move toward ‘simultaneous, free, and fair presidential and parliamentary elections, fulfilling the Libyan people’s desire to determine their future and freely choose their representatives without restrictions.’
Comment: Koury (an American) is currently the Acting SRSG and Mission Head. Abdoulaye Bathily (from Senegal) stepped down as Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in April 2024 after his efforts to revive any sort of political process in Libya failed. Bathily began his tenure in September 2022 after nearly a year in which there was no SRSG following Jan Kubis (from Slovakia) who stepped down in November 2021. Between Kubis and Bathily, former Deputy SRSG to Libya Stephanie Williams (an American) served as the ‘Special Advisor’ of the SG, an appointment which did not require a UNSC vote (as Russia would have vetoed her appointment).
The tussle in the UNSC over the SRSG position is nothing new, with Russia long using its veto power to ensure that no Western diplomats, and certainly no Americans, are appointed to the position. The last two SRSGs accepted by Russia have been from eastern Europe and Africa respectively, and are understood to have had better working relations with Moscow. In 2022, there was a significant degree of instability within UNSMIL as Russia would only allow the mandate to be extended by a month or two at a time as it sought to exert its leverage over the appointment of an SRSG it deemed acceptable.
This had dual benefits (from Russia’s perspective). First it weakened UNSMIL as an institution in Libya and its efforts to support free and fair elections in the country, allowing Russia to extend its influence and footprint in the country in the meantime. This trend has only intensified in recent months with the lack of any meaningful progress within the political process and the inability of the UN to create incentives for the Libyan elite to move ahead with elections. Second, it prevented the appointment of an SRSG who might shake things up in Libya and seek to fundamentally alter the premise on which any political dialogue is based.
Significance: Russia’s move to limit the UNSMIL renewal to only three months is not a surprise given wider geopolitical dynamics and its track record of doing this in the past, but it is unhelpful for the Libyan political process. Although Koury can, and almost certainly will, try to use this period to revive engagement around some sort of dialogue, the lack of an SRSG and the ticking clock on the mandate are likely to limit (further) the momentum and pressure that can be brought to bear. Meanwhile, it remains unlikely that the UNSC will be able to agree on a candidate in the coming months, meaning a renewed period of uncertainty and instability for UNSMIL is likely. As such, the revival of a consensus-based political dialogue remains very unlikely in the short – medium term.
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Renewed troubles between the Zintani PFG AND the 444 Brigade in Hamada al-Hamra amid rumours about moves to take over the NC7 field
Incident: On 30 October, GNU MoI Emad Trabelsi and the head of the MoI’s Border Guard ordered the intensification of desert patrols to monitor smuggling routes in the al-Hamada al-Hamra desert. Patrols from the al-Qaryah Desert Security Sector will patrol valleys and open areas to enhance security and combat illegal activities in this area. On 1 November, a patrol of the 444 Brigade seized three fuel trucks in the al-Hamada al-Hamra desert ‘on their way out of the country’ and arrested the drivers. According to the 444, the incident took place in the very same area where a 444 patrol was ‘kidnapped by smuggling gangs’ on 24 October, indicating that they belonged to the Zintani-led Petroleum Facilities Guards (PFG). The 444 Brigade rejected the ‘smear campaigns and lies’ which it says wrongly claim that the force intends to take over oil field security from the PFG.
NOC pushing for 1.4 million bpd this year as Dabaiba says production is highest in over a decade; Rumours around revival of NC7 deal flare up again
Incident: There has been a flurry of positive reports again this week around increasing oil production rates and plans to increase production further.
On 31 October, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) publically thanked the GNU for supporting the NOC’s efforts ‘to increase daily production rates’, acknowledging that the Special Budget allocated to the NOC was key in achieving the current production of 1,336,185 bpd of crude and condensates. The NOC declared that its next goal is the 1.4 million bpd threshold by the end of the year. On 1 November, GNU PM Dabaiba proudly declared that Libya’s oil production has reached the highest level since 2013. The NOC noted that, in order to reach the 1.4 million bpd production rate in the next few weeks, it is getting ready to restart four fields currently out of service, namely: Al-Dhahra, Al-Bahi, Al-Mabrouk, and Al-Tahara. These fields would add an additional 40,000 bpd to the current production.
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Renewed troubles between the Zintani PFG AND the 444 Brigade in Hamada al-Hamra amid rumours about moves to take over the NC7 field
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