4 June 2025: Oil sector on high alert after attack on the NOC building in Tripoli triggers GNS to threaten oil blockades
This week we look at the GNS threats to shut down oil production, as well as a third week of anti-Dabaiba protests and the HoR approving a 69 billion LYD budget for the Reconstruction Fund.
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Oil sector on high alert after attack on the NOC building in Tripoli triggers GNS to threaten oil blockades unless the HQ is moved out of the capital
Incident: On 28 May, rumours circulated on Libyan social media that the HQ of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) in Tripoli was stormed by militia groups. According to reports, gunfire was heard from around the building. Some sources even said that the NOC Chairman, Massoud Suleiman, was virtually highjacked and kept in the HQ against his will with another two people.
On 28 May, the NOC issued an urgent statement denying the allegation, and clarifying that ‘what happened was nothing more than a limited personal dispute that occurred in the reception area and was immediately resolved by administrative security personnel without any impact on the [NOC]’s workflow’. The NOC also said that its operations continue normally.
Later the same day, the Government of National Stability (GNS) promptly issued a statement condemning ‘the actions of these armed groups in storming the [NOC]’s headquarters, attacking the office of the chairman of its board of directors, and threatening and intimidating its employees with the use of weapons’. The GNS stressed that such attacks on state institutions, especially economic institutions, pose ‘a major threat to the oil sector and to the wealth and livelihood of Libyans in general’ and ‘undermine all opportunities to unify public institutions’. The GNS therefore threatened to halt Libya’s oil production, unless the NOC’s HQ be temporarily relocated out of Tripoli, citing Ras Lanuf and Brega as possible alternative locations.
On 29 May, the Attorney General (AG) said it had detained 3 people for breaking into the NOC HQ. The Government of National Unity’s (GNU) Ministry of Defense confirmed that it had monitored the incident at the NOC and had taken ‘immediate measures’ to deal with the involved individuals and hand them over to the judicial authorities.
Comment: This comes against the background of shifting security dynamics in the capital following the recent clashes and removal of the Stability Support Agency (SSA), with competition for control of key economic institutions among militias in the capital ongoing.
The last major oil blockade took place in Libya in August – September 2024 when the GNS (which does as it is instructed by the LNA) declared force majeure due to the GNU removing changing the CBL leadership. This saw the LNA shutting down several oilfields over a period of weeks. The blockade was only fully lifted when an agreement on a new CBL governor and board was reached.
Significance: Rapid developments and differing narratives have created a confusing scene surrounding the details of the events that took place at the NOC headquarters, with some confirming the storming, others denying it, and others downplaying it as an incident that occurred at the building’s entrance. What seems clear is that all of this stems from the recent instability and shifts in the power dynamics in the capital, with the pro-Dabaiba and Misratan militias trying to redistribute and secure the various key economic institutions while the eastern authorities are trying to leverage the instability to their benefit.
The GNS’s threat to instigate an oil blockade is likely to have been an opportunistic move designed to increase the pressure on Dabaiba and undermine his control over Tripoli. Or the aim may have been to create greater leverage over Dabaiba which the Haftars can use to extract further resources and benefits. The GNU, on the other hand, is trying to make sure the incident is seen and prosecuted as a criminal incident, both to highlight that Tripoli is secure and to remove the justification for a blockade based on the NOC being under militia control. Although it does not seem that the NOC’s operations have been disrupted, L-A has been flagging that such moves to exert greater control over the NOC and CBL are likely given the shifts taking place.
The GNU is very unlikely to agree to or passively accept a relocation of the NOC HQ out of Tripoli – least of all to territory controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA) – as Dabaiba would lose control over the institution and would also acknowledge his inability to guarantee order within the capital. If a precedent of this kind is set, similar initiatives are likely to follow regarding the CBL, making the GNU’s control over the economic pillars of the country hollow. The impending risk, therefore, is that Dabaiba’s refusal to give in to eastern Libya requests triggers another oil blockade.
At this stage, a blockade has not been instigated. However, if the LNA did start a blockade then almost all the oil fields could go offline, taking out nearly 1.4 million bpd. Alternatively, the LNA could replicate their last blockade in the summer of 2024, when only some fields were closed down to start with as a way to increase the pressure on the GNU. In any case, any blockades would be a devastating blow to the reliability of the sector at a moment when the bidding round for new exploration projects is ongoing. Lower oil prices would also increase the negative impact of any shutdowns.
Overall, unless a deal is struck, some sort of disruption is likely to occur in the short-term. Even if a deal is made around the oil sector, wider conflicts and disputes could still trigger blockades. In addition, the leadership and status of the NOC is likely to be under increasing pressure and instability, destabilising the wider sector. In such context, competition among armed groups for influence over key institutions, revenue sources, and infrastructure is likely to continue and intensify in the short-to-medium term.
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Anti-Dabaiba protests continue for third week but at a smaller scale as Dabaiba tries to hold on to power
Incident: Throughout the week in the lead up to Friday, there were calls from Souq al-Jumaa and others for protests against the Dabaiba government, while others warned against such protests, dismissing them as rioting. There were also several smaller protests through the week. On 27 May, the Movement of the People of Souq al-Jumaa officially announced a demonstration on Friday 30 May and called for mass participation. Under the banner of ‘Enough silence on humiliation and looting,’ they asserted their fearlessness and determination to ‘turn the table’ on what they described as ‘a corrupt government of ruin and blatant theft’.
HoR approves budget of 69 billion LYD for Development and Reconstruction Fund, Dabaiba condemns parallel spending of over 100 billion LYD
Incident: On 2 June, the House of Representatives (HoR) held an official session chaired by Speaker Aqeela Saleh in which it discussed the adoption of the development plan for the years 2025-2026-2027. According to the HoR, it ‘approved the preparation of the budget of the Development and Reconstruction Fund for Libya, with the submission of the required clarifications and the comments of the honourable representatives’. It also agreed to a committee, including a member from each electoral district, to meet with the Fund’s management to prepare the budget and clarify how the budget will be spent on all regions.
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Anti-Dabaiba protests continue for third week but at a smaller scale as Dabaiba tries to hold on to power
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