31 July 2024: 444 Brigade skirmishes with LNA near al-Shuwayrif
This week we look at skirmishes between the 444 and the LNA, the HoR opening the nomination phase for a new PM, and claims that Russian-printed notes are contributing to devaluation.
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GNU and 444 Brigade seek to tackle fuel smuggling in western region; 444 Brigade skirmishes with LNA in al-Shuwayrif
Incident: The Government of National Unity (GNU) and aligned armed groups are seeking to crackdown on fuel smuggling, or at least be seen to be doing so.
On 22 July, the 444 Brigade announced that all smuggling routes to the South in the centre of the country had been interrupted. At the same time, assurances were given that the fuel supply for all filling stations in the South had been secured.
On 24 July, the technical committee formed earlier in the month by Prime Minister’s Decree No. 308 of 2024 to evaluate electronic fuel regulation met to discuss the smuggling prevention system provided by Al-Namaa Oil Investment Company. It was agreed that the first phase of the project would be to monitor the distribution of diesel to major consumers, as it represents 60% of the total fuel supplied.
There have also been rising tensions between the 444 Brigade and the Libyan National Army (LNA) around al-Shuwarif.
On 23 July, a skirmish took place in al-Shuwayrif between the 444 Brigade and the 128th Battalion of the LNA. The LNA’s Southern Operations Room ordered the 444 Brigade to withdraw from al-Shuwayrif immediately otherwise these forces would be attacked. Over the next few days, the 444 Brigade withdrew north to al-Qaryah al-Sharqiyah without further fighting.
On 25 July, the LNA deployed additional forces to al-Shuwayrif.
On 27 July, the Western Mountain Military Region, commanded by the Zintani Osama Juwaili, deployed troops to establish checkpoints on the Mizdah – al-Shuwayrif road to replace the 444 Brigade (or - depending on the point of view – to prevent them from returning). On 28 and 29 July, Juwaili deployed additional troops into this region, reaching in total a strength of about 200 - 250.
Comment: In recent weeks, the 444 Brigade has massively increased its patrol activities south of Jabal Nafusah in the al-Hamada al-Hamra area. It is claimed that this serves to combat smuggling.
Al-Shuwayrif is located approximately 200 km south-east of Mizdah, on the main Ghariyan - Sebha route at the junction of the road to Abu Qurayn which is located south of Misrata. It is controlled by the LNA. The LNA also nominally controls most of the territory in the south-west, around Sebha, Awbari and Murzuq. It may be that the LNA hopes that Juwaili and his forces could expand their control further to the south-west to take control of Ghadames on the Algerian- Tunisian border.
Juwaili is a powerful Zintani commander who has been at loggerheads with Dabaiba since he took power, supporting Fathi Bashaagha’s failed attempts to take over the capital in 2022.
Fuel smuggling, as other forms of smuggling, remains a major social, economic and security issue. The GNU’s recent attempt to take control of the Ras Ajdir border crossing (which is currently open) was purportedly to crackdown on the vast amounts of smuggled fuel which crosses that border. According to Attaqa, Libya has the lowest petrol prices in the MENA region, and the second lowest globally, with only Iran having cheaper fuel. This creates a system where smugglers can earn lucrative income by selling on the cheap fuel at more expensive prices, whether across the border or within Libya on the black market. This means Libya often has fuel shortages, especially in the isolated southern region, while it is spending colossal amounts on importing fuel at global market price (as Libya does not have much refining capacity).
Significance: Dabaiba and armed groups such as the 444 Brigade are hoping to strengthen their credibility by improving (or at the least be seen to be improving) the fuel situation in the western and southern region. However, it is doubtful that the 444 Brigade is actually capable of interrupting all smuggling routes to the South. The terrain is simply too vast for this and the 444 is too weak in terms of numbers. It also has too little technical equipment such as drones, thermal imaging devices and radar equipment.
Meanwhile, these attempts to expand anti-smuggling operations are bringing the 444 Brigade into conflict with the LNA. Al-Shuwayrif is a strategically important location. As such, it is unlikely that the LNA would surrender it to the 444 Brigade without a fight. Osama Juwaili’s force is certainly more acceptable to the LNA than the 444 Brigade, but it can be assumed that several of those are involved in smuggling themselves. With LNA support, Juwaili may even be able to extend his control further to the south, perhaps as far as Ghadames. However, neither side is likely to want an escalation of the situation – none of the Libyan actors or their international backers really want to see a renewed LNA vs Tripoli conflict. It is possible that there will be an uptick in localised skirmishes between armed groups and smugglers, and between LNA forces and western region forces around al-Shuwarif and the western border region in the short term. However, a major escalation of fighting remains unlikely.
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HoR opens nominations for new PM; HSC rejects HoR’s unilateral actions
Incident: On 27 July, the House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aqeela Saleh announced that the nominations for the position of Prime Minister will open on 28 July until 11 August. Saleh said that anyone who wants to run for office and believes they are qualified must submit their nomination documents to the office of the Rapporteur of the HoR in Benghazi. He also called on the High State Council (HSC) presidency and members to recommend anyone they see as qualified to hold the position of PM.
In response, on 28 July the HSC issued a statement in which it called on the HoR to stop issuing unilateral decisions.
Reuters says unofficial Russian-printed banknotes contributed to devaluation of dinar; Russia denies any involvement
Incident: On 24 July, Reuters reported that ‘unofficial Libyan banknotes have been exchanged for real dollars and contributed to the dinar's devaluing’ with some notes printed by Russia and exported to eastern Libya this year while others were printed illicitly within Libya. According to Reuters’ sources, the new banknotes - which the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) has declared to be counterfeit - are being changed into hard currency on the black market or via deposits made in eastern banks by shell companies that use import letters of credit to send US dollars from the CBL to companies overseas. The money may have been used to finance infrastructure and reconstruction projects in the East as well as to finance Russian mercenary activity in Libya and the Sahel. On 25 July, the Russian embassy issued a statement denying the reports of its involvement.
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From our Blog..
On 24 July, Reuters published a report by Maya Gebeily and Angus Mcdowall titled ‘Illicit banknotes in east Libya, some made by Russia, hit dinar’. Citing several sources, the report claims that unofficial Libyan banknotes - including some printed by Russia and others within Libya - have been...read more
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HoR opens nominations for new PM; HSC rejects HoR’s unilateral actions
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