3 July 2024: Ras Ajdir border formally reopens but underlying tensions could threaten its longevity
This week we look at the re-opening of the Ras Ajdir border crossing, EU attempts to implement a joint position on migration, and continued instability in the oil sector.
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Ras Ajdir border formally reopens but underlying tensions could threaten its longevity
Incident: Prime Minister Abdul Hameed Dabaiba’s deal with the Amazigh paved the way for the Ras Ajdir border to reopen this week. On 25 June, the Amazigh armed groups lifted their blockade of the coastal road at Mellitah Oil & Gas Company following PM Dabaiba's assurances to Zuwara representatives that various development projects would be implemented and security conditions would be improved. Zuwara agreed to allow the Ras Ajdir border crossing to be formally reopened later that week. Tensions and violent altercations continued sporadically in the following days, but did not escalate.
On 26 June, PM Dabaiba held a meeting on the opening of the Ras Ajdir border crossing with the participation of Minister of Interior (MoI) Emad Trabelsi, Libyan Army Deputy CoS Salaheddin al-Namroush and several MoI experts. Dabaiba emphasized that joint efforts must be intensified so that the border crossing can finally be opened.
On 28 June, Namroush inspected the Libyan Army troops in the Abu Kammash area and declared the Abu Kammash - Ras Ajdir area a restricted military area. He said that the entry of military forces is prohibited without the authorization of the Libyan Army and warned that unauthorized vehicles would be attacked with combat drones. Ministry of Defence forces and MoI-linked Zawiyya militias moved to the border in preparation for the opening.
On 1 July in the morning, the Ras Ajdir border crossing was reopened for general border traffic by Government of National Unity (GNU) MoI Trabelsi and the Tunisian MoI Khaled al-Nuwairi. There were no incidents. PM Dabaiba was not present at the opening. Trabelsi explained in the joint press conference that the previous closure was aimed at better organizing the border to end insecurity and instability. He added that the plan to reopen the border crossing includes facilitating travel between the two countries and providing new control facilities. He emphasized that an official police force from his ministry will now be responsible for securing the border on the Libyan side. All previous staff had been replaced. The MoI explained that its forces and the Libyan Army troops were working closely together to fully secure the border crossing and to secure the entire Libyan border from al-Assah to Wazin.
Trabelsi explained that the Libyan economy was being undermined by smuggling, especially of fuel and consumer goods, through this region. He promised to put an end to this. His ministry would also endeavour to secure and reopen the Ghadames - al-Dabdab border crossing with Algeria. Smuggling from all regions is also taking place across this border. The MoI also expressed its willingness to cooperate with the ‘armed forces’ under the command of Khalifa Haftar in the East in order to secure the southern border.
PM Dabaiba, together with key advisors and ministers, visited Zuwara after the opening of the border crossing, where he was welcomed by the mayor and members of the Municipal Council as well as representatives of the Nobles & Elders council. During the talks, the city's most pressing problems were - once again - discussed. In the afternoon, GECOL brought various materials, including transformers, to Zuwara to repair the power grid.
Comment: The border crossing had been closed since 19 March 2024 after Trabelsi sought to bring it under the direct control of the MoI and the local Amazigh militias which controlled the border pushed back – both because they did not want to lose control over the lucrative smuggling routes through the border and because they saw this as a partisan move by the Zintani Trabelsi to extend Zintani (and therefore Arab) control over the region. Libya's border crossings in the west and south have not been under the de facto control of the government in Tripoli since 2011. Local militias, which often formally belong to the MoI and are financed by it, control the border crossings, not just the one at Ras Ajdir. This also ‘facilitates’ smuggling, which is not only a business worth millions, but also represents one of the few income opportunities for the local population in many border regions.
After months of clashes, talks and false starts, the border partially reopened for emergency humanitarian and diplomatic cases in mid-June, with the full reopening originally slated for 23 June. However, Amazigh armed groups from Zuwara blocked the coastal road leading to the border preventing the opening, forcing Dabaiba to promise to address the poor electricity and water infrastructure in the region, as well as the deteriorating security situation in the area.
In his speech on 1 July, Dabaiba promised to continuously monitor the relevant projects of the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), the Man-Made River Authority (MMRA) and other bodies. The security situation in the vicinity of the city and the measures to open the border crossing were also discussed. The PM emphasized that it is absolutely necessary for the state to take direct control of the border crossing with qualified and well-trained personnel, also to improve the processes for travellers.
Significance: Although it remains to be seen how the situation on the ground will develop, the reopening of the border crossing on the government's terms is undoubtedly a success for PM Dabaiba and for Trabelsi. Both will want to use this victory to strengthen their image and project power. However, any moves to further expand GNU control in the western and south-western region could create fresh conflict and pushback against Dabaiba, meaning he has a thin line to tread.
The deal which predicated the reopening of Ras Ajdir remains fragile, as do the relations between the various armed groups deployed in and around the border. The Amazigh equate the desired ‘state control’ of Ras Ajdir with the control of individuals and their tribes, in this case with Emad Trabelsi and the arch-enemies of the Amazigh, the Zintanis. As such, it would not take much for tensions to escalate and the Amazigh to re-shut the border. In addition, while the currently deployed MoI and MoD troops are from Zawiyya and are broadly at odds with the Zintanis, they are also considered troublemakers by the Amazigh. The Zawiyyans want to expand their control over the lucrative smuggling networks through the region, bringing them into conflict with the Amazigh.
While Dabaiba has sought to take tangible action to address Amazigh concerns, it is unclear whether he has the ability or desire to follow through on these promises in the weeks and months to come. If conditions do not improve or fresh issues emerge, it remains likely that the Amazigh will seek to disrupt operations at the border once more. In short, while the border is likely to remain open in the immediate term given all the fanfare, it is likely to face further disruptions in the short-medium term.
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EU Delegation focuses on municipal elections, budgets, and migration in diplomatic and technical meetings in Libya
Incident: The EU has held several meetings with Libyan stakeholders this week, stressing a joint European position towards the political, economic and security situation in Libya. On 26 and 27 June, the EU Ambassadors and Heads of Mission accredited to Libya, including those based in Tunis, held a series of meetings in Tripoli including with GNU PM Abdul Hameed Dabaiba, Presidential Council (PC) head Muhammed al-Menfi, and High National Elections Commission (HNEC) head Emad al-Sayeh.
On the political front, the EU delegation encouraged the GNU to ‘support municipal elections as a stepping stone towards national elections through an inclusive UNSMIL-led process’, achieve a unified national budget for the transparent and fair allocation of national wealth and fight corruption. They also agreed to continue strengthening Libya’s partnership with Europe and the dialogue on the political process, the economy and security.
Aoun calls on Dabaiba to reinstate or dismiss him to end confusion, as tussle for control of MOOG continues
Incident: On 27 June, the GNU Ministry of Oil and Gas (MOOG) published a statement by its head, Muhammed Aoun, in which the latter publicly detailed the circumstances surrounding his suspension by the Administrative Control Authority (ACA) on 25 March – which later reinstated him on 12 May.
While stressing that his return to the MOOG was widely welcomed both domestically and internationally, Aoun noted that he has repeatedly appealed to GNU PM Dabaiba to ‘put the [ACA] decision into effect’ and enable Aoun ‘to carry out’ his duties. However, Aoun blamed the PM’s office for blocking communication, ignoring calls, rejecting correspondence, and refusing to schedule appointments with PM Dabaiba. Aoun criticised this conduct as highly inappropriate institutionally.
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EU Delegation focuses on municipal elections, budgets, and migration in diplomatic and technical meetings in Libya
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