26 March 2025: MoI Emad Trabelsi and NSC outline competing plans to combat illegal migration
This week we look at the latest anti-illegal migration strategies, as well as 'Fighting in Gharyan between Force 444 and Ghnaiwa’s SSA/555' and 'NOC & MOOG try to foster international partnerships'
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MoI Emad Trabelsi and NSC outline competing plans to combat illegal migration
Incident: On 18 March, Minister of Interior (MoI) Emad Trabelsi chaired a meeting with European Union and African Union diplomats, as well as with representatives from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to address irregular migration in Libya. Trabelsi stressed the need to secure southern borders, rather than solely monitoring coasts as the EU suggests, and called for more international support. Trabelsi warned of severe security and economic challenges and urged affected countries to provide practical assistance, such as modern border surveillance equipment and support for voluntary deportations.
During this meeting, MoI Trabelsi outlined a three-step plan to address Libya's migration crisis. The first step is to secure the southern border and stop the flow of migrants. The second step is to deport migrants from Libya by land and sea in an ‘organized and ethical’ manner. The third step is to launch a national security operation against human trafficking gangs led by Libyans. He stressed the financial burden of deportations and called for international support, particularly from the EU. Trabelsi explained that the cost of food for a migrant is no less than 30 dinars [per day], while the cost of providing shelter is around 4,000 dinars a month. The cost of deportation by air ranges from $900 to $1,300 per migrant, while deportation by land costs more than 2,000 dinars per person. The MoI highlighted Libya's generosity in hosting ‘millions’ of migrants and providing them with services free of charge, and affirmed that Libya will not become a settlement zone for migrants. He called for national unity to address migration issues and condemned violent protests against migrants. Trabelsi stated that ‘we are not against the principle of demonstrations’ and affirmed that ‘the voice and message of the citizen has already been heard’, claiming, ‘the [interior] ministry is ready to cooperate with authorities in the south to secure the borders. At least 100,000 migrants are to be deported within four months, possibly reaching 700,000 by the end of the year.’
On the same day, the National Security Committee of Libya's High Council of State (HCS), chaired by Abdel Fattah Hablous, firmly rejected any attempts to settle illegal immigrants in the country. During their meeting, they discussed the challenges posed by illegal immigration, emphasizing its significant impact on Libya's social, economic, and demographic stability.
On 22 March, the Libyan National Security Council presented a strategic plan to address the ‘growing crisis of irregular migration’. The council stressed that ‘ad hoc solutions are inadequate, calling for a comprehensive strategy involving legislative, diplomatic, economic, and security measures.’ The NSC called for:
1) Legislative Reforms should include an amendment of migration-related laws, including Decision No. 44 of 2013, which prohibits the interim government from signing agreements or memorandums of understanding that may limit Libya's sovereignty, especially those related to defining borders or exploiting natural resources, and strengthen human rights legislation.
2) Regulations to legalize foreign residents' status and prevent the employment of irregular migrants while promoting voluntary return through a dedicated program should be introduced.
3) The February 2017 Libya-Italy Memorandum of Understanding, which has worsened the migration crisis, should be repealed. The 2008 Treaty of Friendship between Libya and Italy, especially the article which aims to ensure non-interference in Libyan affairs, should be implemented and strengthened.
4) Libya should advocate for international cooperation to manage migration without settling migrants in Libya.
5) Economic measures should include the provision of financial incentives for migrants to return to their home countries, and partial salary support and humanitarian aid while they are in Libya.
6) Migrant detention centers should be closed step-by-step, while reintegration programs should be funded for migrants who have returned home.
7) On the security side, border monitoring must be strengthened, migrant registration conducted, human trafficking networks dismantled, and while security forces must be trained in human rights and international law.
8) The Coast Guard must be restructured to improve professionalism and independence. The council called for synchronized implementation of this strategy and urged international partners, including the EU, to share the financial burden of border management.
It also emphasized Libya's readiness to assist migrants seeking voluntary return, while opposing efforts to settle migrants within the country. According to the council, these measures aim to ‘protect Libya's sovereignty and alleviate the social, economic, and security impact of irregular migration.’
Comment: The municipality of Kufra addressed rumours claiming over a million Sudanese refugees entered Libya, stating the figure is inaccurate and significantly lower. Abdullah Suleiman, the municipality's media director, highlighted the difficulty in tracking actual refugee numbers due to limited border monitoring. He noted that more than 120,000 health certificates have been issued to Sudanese refugees.
The National Security Council was established by Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2007 as a body headquartered in Tripoli and affiliated with the General People’s Congress. Among its responsibilities is the preparation of strategies in the areas of internal and external security, defense, and foreign affairs. Today it is affiliated with the House of Representatives (HoR). The National Security Advisor and the Council’s Secretary General is the former Minister of Interior and Judge Ibrahim Bushnaf. He was appointed by the HoR on 15 June 2021. The National Security Council is chaired by the PM of the Government of National Stability (GNS) and is an exclusively GNS-aligned body. Members include the National Security Advisor (with the rank of a Deputy PM of the GNS), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GNS, Minister of Defense of the GNS, Minister of Interior of the GNS, Minister of Finance and the Minister of Economy of the GNS). The Security Advisor of PM Abdul Hameed Dabaiba is Ibrahim Dabaiba, but he is usually not referred to as "National" Security Advisor.
Significance: Libya has two governments and therefore two plans for dealing with illegal migration – both of which are crafted for domestic PR reasons and neither of which is fully implementable. The Government of National Unity (GNU) enjoys international recognition, has access to funds, but physically controls only northern Tripolitania. On the other side, the GNS is internationally isolated, has limited funds, but is recognized by the HoR and aligned with the Libyan National Army (LNA) which has physical control of most of Libya. Unsurprisingly, the plan of the GNU MoI Trabelsi does not foresee any legal measures, as it is not able to get the HoR to amend Libyan law. It is unlikely that the LNA will allow Trabelsi to take over border control in the southwest of the country. However, he would not have the required assets anyway, as he is only able to deploy a couple of troops to Southern Fezzan for patrolling and checkpoints. The strategy of the National Security Council is much more complex and includes several legislative and administrative changes, none of which will likely be implemented soon. If the EU intends to seriously support border security in Libya's south - which is of utmost interest to the Union - it will need to talk and cooperate with those who are more or less de-facto in charge of this region, which means the LNA. This may explain why Italy and other players have been increasingly engaging with Haftar of late.
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Fighting in Gharyan between Force 444 and Ghnaiwa’s SSA/555
Incident: On 18 March, a large number of heavily-armed Force 444 troops from Tripoli arrived in the al-Qadamah area in central Gharyan. This prompted a state of alert by the Gharyan Branch of the Stability Support Agency (SSA) of the MoI and of the 555th Infantry Brigade, which formally belongs to the Libyan Army, but is functionally affiliated with the SSA. Both SSA and 555 mobilized their troops and increased their presence on the streets of Gharyan. Allegedly the deployment of Force 444 was triggered by the recent arrest of eight to ten young recruits to the unit from Gharyan by the 555th Infantry Brigade (555) and the seizure of three to five of their vehicles at a checkpoint. Subsequently, Force 444 threatened to storm Gharyan and attack the 555 unless their detained recruits were released immediately.
NOC & MOOG try to foster international partnerships and raise production
Incident: On 17 March, GNU PM Dabaiba held an extensive meeting with the Chairman of the National Oil Corporation (NOC), Masoud Suleiman. Suleiman presented the supposed ‘outcomes’ of the general bidding round (BR) held in Houston, USA, which saw broad participation from international companies, supposedly reflecting ‘growing confidence in Libya’s oil sector’. Preparations for new bidding rounds in Istanbul and China in the coming months were also reportedly discussed – all as part of a supposedly ‘coherent strategy’ to expand international partnerships and attract modern technology to Libya to enhance production.
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Fighting in Gharyan between Force 444 and Ghnaiwa’s SSA/555
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