26 February 2025: Amazigh flag incident sparks street protests and widespread condemnation
This week we look at protests over the trampling of an Amazigh flag in Tripoli, as well as mounting economic pressures around the CBL and fresh NOC appointments to Waha and Mellitah.
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Amazigh flag incident sparks street protests and widespread condemnation in western region
Incident: On 17 February, a group of young men placed the Amazigh flag on a street in Hay al-Andalus in western Tripoli, forcing cars to drive over it, during the celebrations of the 17 February 2011 Revolution. The video was subsequently widely circulated on social media.
There have been protests and condemnations by Amazigh actors and communities.
On 21 February, the Municipal Council of Zuwara condemned the running over of the Amazigh flag in Tripoli, calling it an unacceptable, dangerous, and provocative act aimed at erasing identity and sowing discord. The council stated that this flag is not just a symbol, but a national flag for which all Amazigh cities have shed their blood. They urged authorities to take action and called on the citizens of their city to fly the Amazigh flag to express pride in their identity, emphasizing that an attack on the Amazigh identity is a red line and an attack on the dignity of the entire Libyan nation.
Later in the afternoon, about 80-100 Amazigh protested in front of some Public Security Agency vehicles on a street in Hay Andalus. The situation did not escalate.
Amazigh residents and activists in the city of Jadu organized a street protest against the insult to their flag, claiming it had been carried out by individuals affiliated with the Government of National Unity (GNU) Ministry of Interior (MoI) and some others. They demanded that the MoI and the PM hold those involved in this ‘racist act’ accountable and threatened to ‘pursue options’ if that does not happen. Furthermore, they demanded an official apology from the MoI. Residents, dignitaries, activists and civil society institutions in the Amazigh city Yefran condemned the incident, which they described as a violation of the values of peaceful coexistence and sowing discord among Libyans.
On 22 February, Amazigh protesters temporarily blocked the road from Nalut to Tripoli in several locations. Furthermore, tires were burned at the junction to Zintan.
The mayors of seven Amazigh municipalities, Zuwara, Nalut, Jadu, Yefran, Kabaw, al-Ghala, and Wazin, sharply condemned the attack on their flag in a joint statement, holding MoI Emad Trabelsi responsible. The mayors blamed the MoI for failing to intervene, although security forces were at the scene. They demanded that the Attorney General take immediate action, issue arrest warrants for those involved and bring them to justice.
In the evening of the same day, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Amazigh Libya, al-Hadi Balraqi, said that the GNU had not yet communicated with the Council regarding the attack on the Amazigh flag. He said that the Amazigh started an open sit-in in the Amazigh areas in the Western Mountain and several neighbourhoods in Tripoli and will not stop until an official apology is issued by the government and the perpetrators are arrested. If their demands are not met, they will escalate the sit-in and engage in civil disobedience.
On 23 February, there were again some minor street protests in several Amazigh cities in the Jabal Nafusa, including in Nalut and Jadu.
Other political and security actors have also condemned the incident and pledged to investigate.
One of the two rival High State Council (HSC) heads Khaled al-Mishri affirmed his pride in the Amazigh identity and called on the Presidential Council, the GNU and all concerned parties to ensure the preservation of the social fabric of the country. Al-Mishri called for an urgent investigation and stressed the need to bring the ‘instigators of sedition’ to justice as soon as possible. He expressed deep concern over the security tensions in some neighbourhoods of Tripoli and cities in the Western Mountains, calling on all parties to exercise restraint, reason and avoid any action that could lead to a deterioration of the security situation.
The GNU expressed its strong condemnation of the attack on the Amazigh flag. It said that PM Abdul Hameed Dabaiba issued instructions to take legal action to punish those who attacked the Amazigh flag. Dabaiba said that his government would deal firmly and in accordance with the law with any attempt to undermine national unity.
The Public Security Agency announced that those who trampled on the Amazigh flag will be prosecuted, but said that those appearing in the video do not belong to the Public Security Agency. Such irresponsible actions are completely rejected.
Comment: Libya has experienced long-standing conflicts between Arab tribes and the original native population of the region, the Amazigh, Tuareg and Tebu. The Amazigh, Tuareg, and Tebu minorities were largely disenfranchised under Qadhafi, who denied them their own identity. In particular, the Amazigh population, which includes a large number of Ibadi Muslims, faced ethnic and religious discrimination. After the 2011 revolution, the Amazigh hoped for greater political and cultural rights, demanding official recognition of their language and fair representation in government, but they remained largely unsuccessful. For the Amazigh, their flag is of particular significance as it represents their identity, their culture and their history.
The Zintani-dominated Public Security Agency is led by Abdullah Trabelsi, the brother of the MoI Emad Trabelsi. Its HQ is in the Tobacco Factory just south of the Second Ring Road in Addrebe.
Significance: Tribal conflicts in Libya continue to lead to violent tit-for-tat episodes which are then worsened by the absence of credible law enforcement bodies and an independent judiciary. For the Amazigh, the flag incident fits into a broader pattern of marginalization. This includes the many promises made to them by PM Dabaiba that failed to materialize, the struggle about the control of the Ras Ajdir and Wazin border crossing sites, and the current military operation against smuggling in the area Ras Ajdir - Abu Kammash - Zuwara.
For the time being, the GNU does not seem to really care about the Amazigh protests, including the road blockades and sit-ins, as they don’t have high visibility. If the MoI has a serious interest in holding those involved in the attack on the Amazigh flag responsible, this should be relatively easy as they can be clearly identified in the videos spread on social media. But if the government fails to act, which seems more likely, this might be a further step towards escalation with the Amazigh and stronger demands by them for self-governance. However, an immediate escalation is unlikely.
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CBL Governor under pressure as HoR condemns meeting with US; Despite push for transparency and reform, Libya’s economic situation remains perilous
Incident: The US has held several meetings this week with key political and economic players, stressing the need for more transparency and a unified budget, provoking pushback from the HoR. On 18 February, the Governor of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), Naji Muhammed Essa, met with the US Special Envoy to Libya Richard Norland, and the US Chargé d’Affaires Jeremy Berndt. They reportedly discussed the CBL’s independence, its technocratic integrity, and its efforts to improve transparent revenue management. Norland stressed that the US is ‘committed to partnering with Libya to help it promote economic stability and long-term prosperity’. Later the same day, First Deputy HoR Speaker Fawzi al-Nuwairi published an official statement reiterating ‘the need to respect the sovereignty of the Libyan state and its national institutions, and not to allow any foreign interference in its internal affairs, especially with regard to sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank’.
NOC appoints new figures at Waha and Mellitah; Sabah oilfield restarts and Russia extends ban on selling gasoline to Libya, among other countries
Incident: The National Oil Corporation (NOC) has reported some operational successes this week, though an extension to Russian gasoline exports may not be welcome. On 22 February, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced that the Sabah oilfield resumed operations through the first well G-18, after a ten-year hiatus. The well’s production capacity is about 600 bpd, which is transported by mobile tankers to the Zella field – about 90 km away from the Sabah oilfield. On 22 February, the Zueitina Oil Operations Company announced that it has restarted the main cooling tower (E-29) at the LNG plant and the gas and condensate liquefaction plant at the Intisar 103-D field.
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CBL Governor under pressure as HoR condemns meeting with US; Despite push for transparency and reform, Libya’s economic situation remains perilous
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