21 May 2025: PM Dabaiba fights for political survival amid resignations
This week we look at PM Dabaiba's political crisis amid protests and HoR moves to replace him, as well as US plans to resettle Gazans in Libya and the impact of the instability on the oil sector.
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PM Dabaiba fights for political survival amid resignations and HoR moves to appoint a new PM; Dabaiba says the GNU is tackling corrupt militias
Incident: In the wake of the killing of Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) commander Abdul Ghani al-Kikli (Ghinaywa) last week and the subsequent clashes, mobilisations and significant protests in Tripoli, the Government of National Unity (GNU) PM Abdul Hameed Dabaiba is under more pressure than ever before. His opponents are seeking to capitalise on this, with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High State Council (HSC) under Khaled al-Mishri fast-tracking efforts to appoint a new unified government to replace the GNU, with the HoR holding sessions to review prime ministerial candidates this week.
On 14 May, HoR Speaker Aqeela Saleh condemned the GNU’s actions in Tripoli and accused UNSMIL of not putting enough pressure on the GNU and other stakeholders to create a unified government.
On 16 May, the HSC headed by Khaled al-Mishri issued a statement announcing the withdrawal of confidence in the GNU led Dabaiba, citing the government's loss of political, legal and popular legitimacy after it failed to implement the elections and exceeded its legal term. A number of mayors from Fezzan and from the Sirte Basin released a statement demanding the fall of Dabaiba and called on HoR and HSC to assume their responsibility to designate a new unity government.
The HoR then started practical steps toward forming a new government and announced the formation of a joint committee with the Mishri-led HSC to select a new prime minister. The committee includes eight members, four from each side, whose task is to review and sort the candidates' files. The committee held its first meeting on 18 May. The HSC under Muhammed Takala rejected what it called unilateral HoR moves to select a new PM.
The HoR Rapporteur Sabah Jumaa said on 18 May that the committee had reviewed 11 existing files, plus 2 new ones, and had referred them to the Attorney General to ensure they meet legal requirements, prior to presenting them to the HoR for a final decision.
On 19 May, the HoR held an official session in Benghazi chaired by Saleh. According to the official spokesperson Abdullah Bilhaq, the session agreed to: Assign a Prime Minister to form a government whose primary mission is to conduct presidential and parliamentary elections; Submit a report examining the files of candidates for prime minister, including the Attorney General's observations on the candidates; Candidate files for prime minister will continue to be accepted for two days, to give those who wish to run for office the opportunity; After that, the candidates will be summoned to hear their programmes and work plans. The HoR will then set a session to select a prime minister who will be tasked with forming a government to present to the HoR for confidence.
In his speech to the session, Saleh declared that the time has come for Dabaiba to leave power ‘voluntarily or by force’, describing the GNU as ‘isolated and illegitimate’. He noted the HoR had long ago withdrawn confidence in the GNU and said that Dabaiba was now definitively delegitimized by the alleged use of violence against unarmed protesters. The use of firearms against civilians was defined by Saleh as a ‘tragedy and a crime that requires an immediate political change’, attributing political responsibility to Dabaiba.
The HoR session continued on 20 May. It agreed to summon PM candidates in the next session on 26 May and to inform UNSMIL and international ambassadors about the HoR process for forming a government and the dates. The Attorney General’s report on the PM candidates was presented to the members as was the number of endorsements submitted by the PM candidates in their nomination files. It also requested the Attorney General to investigate the storming of the General Intelligence Service HQ in Tripoli and to report on what happened in the cases investigated.
Interestingly, the Government of National Stability (GNS) PM Osama Hammad also added his voice to the calls for a unified government to be formed that would pave the way for fair presidential and parliamentary elections in a speech on 18 May, stressing the need for Dabaiba to leave office and to be held accountable for his ‘crimes’ and use of forces against the Libyan people in recent days. Hammad also condemned the PC’s lack of action and the ‘international community’s silence.’
Dabaiba has sought to project power and moral authority over events in Tripoli by framing them as a move to remove the militias and has pushed back against the condemnation by his opponents and the calls for him to step down.
Late on 17 May, PM Dabaiba made a televised speech to the Libyan people – his first such speech since the violence and instability began on 12 May – in which he outlined his rationale for moving against Ghinaywa and stressed that he had delayed giving this speech to avoid any misunderstanding or enflaming tensions further. He said that after the February Revolution, militias gained significant control over Libya's financial, economic, and social sectors. His government inherited this and tried to address it. While some militias withdrew or joined state institutions, a third obstinate group became powerful ‘sharks’ extorting the state. Dabaiba declared that Libya is entering a ‘decisive phase’ in reclaiming state authority from powerful armed militias and that the GNU would no longer tolerate chaos or allow non-state actors to control Libyans' destiny. He said there was finally hope that the militias can be removed from the Libyan state.
He stressed that Ghinaywa had significant influence over the Abu Salim area and over banks and institutions within the country, that anyone who got on the wrong side of him was put ‘in prisons or in the cemetery.’ As such, Dabaiba portrayed the security operation which saw the SSA largely removed from Abu Salim as one of liberation, noting it was a quick and successful operation with limited damage inflicted. He stressed that new security appointments were made to remove the SSA’s influence, notably replacing the head of the Internal Security Agency (ISA).
Dabaiba went on to admit that mistakes were made in the days after the Abu Salim operation – the move to disband the Special Deterrence Force (Rada) and the clashes that followed – and stressed that he did not intend there to be a conflict. However, he claimed these mistakes were quickly addressed and warned militia members that they must now choose between integrating into state institutions or facing legal consequences. He said the fear barrier has been broken, and ‘we must not defend blackmailers and criminals’.
Dabaiba also warned that there were people seeking to exploit the instability to promote a ‘coup project’ in the capital, claiming that ‘Aqeela, Mishri and Rajma [HoR Speaker Aqeela Saleh, HSC head Khaled al-Mishri, and the LNA] want you to stay at the mercy of militias.’ He admitted that some of the Friday protests the previous day were legitimate, but claimed that most had been ‘paid for’ by rivals looking to undermine him and the GNU. He also said he had international support.
Following the HoR session on 19 May and Saleh’s strong speech against him, Dabaiba said in a post on his personal Facebook page that Saleh ‘knows no shame’ given he is a ‘warmonger who espoused the aggression against Tripoli for more than a year and two months, and contributed to the legalisation of bombing and destruction [referring to the Tripoli War 2019-2020]. He also referred to the fates of the HoR members who have been disappeared.
Despite several resignations from his government (which the GNU denies), Dabaiba has sought to demonstrate that he still has support from key communities through various meetings and by projecting a ‘business as normal’ approach to government.
In the run up to planned protests on Friday 16 May in Tripoli, there were reports of several GNU ministers resigning. Minister of Local Government Badr al-Tumi and Minister of Housing Abu Bakr al-Ghawi posted a video confirming their decision. The GNU Minister of Economy and Trade Muhammed al-Huweij also reportedly resigned as did Ramadan Abu Jennah, the second deputy PM and (already suspended) Minister of Health. Rumours about the Finance Minister Khaled al-Mabrouk and Justice Minister Halima al-Bousifi also circulated – the GNU directly denied the latter was true. On 16 May, the GNU denied there had been resignations and stressed that all ministries were operating normally.
Over the following days, the official GNU Facebook pages published a flurry of reports about official meetings being held by a wide range of different ministries, focusing on key projects in their areas (not necessarily related to the recent violence). In addition, Dabaiba held a series of meetings with representatives of local communities to discuss the situation in the capital.
The UN and a wide range of international actors have been calling for calm and seeking to facilitate mediation, with Dabaiba holding a well-publicised meeting with several ambassadors presumably designed to show he still has international backing.
Comment: The HoR-led PM nomination process for a unified government has moved ahead in fits and starts over the last couple of years, with Aqeela Saleh insisting that the HoR has passed the relevant legislation based on the 6+6 Committee outputs in 2023. However, UNSMIL and internationals have insisted that outstanding areas of disagreement and controversy in the electoral laws need to be addressed before a new government is appointed. As such, Saleh has generally pushed the PM nomination process forward at times when he wants to leverage influence over the UN process or be seen to be making process. In July 2024, nominations for PM were opened and in December 2024, several candidates were reviewed and their files submitted to the Attorney General. There has been little official progress since then.
The list of nominated PM candidates is as follows: Salamah Ibrahim al-Ghweil; Abdul Basit Muhammed; Abdul Hakim Ali Ayou; Othman Adam al-Basir; Ali Muhammed Stones; Othman Abdul Jalil; Fadel al-Amin; Muhammed al-Mazoughi; Muhammed Abdulatif al-Muntasir; Nasser Muhammed Weiss; and finally Issam Muhammed Abu Zuriba, a general and GNS MoI who is close to Haftar. The additional two candidates are Issam Abu Khudair and Abdul Karim Muqayq.
A key refrain of Dabaiba’s opponents, both in general and specifically related to his framing and narrative around the clashes, is that he is a hypocrite and an opportunist. He says his aim is to free Tripoli from the clutches of the militias, yet he has worked with them, funnelled funds to them, and used them to help enrich himself and his position. Furthermore, while he is framing Ghinaywa as an unruly militia outside the control of the state, the same is true of the remaining armed groups in and around Tripoli, whether they currently support him or not. Dabaiba has also been condemned for not expressing enough sympathy for those who were killed or injured in the clashes.
Significance: Although Dabaiba remains in power for now, it is clear that he is now under more political pressure to stand down or be removed than he has been throughout his chequered tenure as GNU PM. He is doing everything he can to protect his position by trying to secure support from Tripoli residents and influential stakeholders and armed group leaders. He is doing this through a strong focus on being seen to be in charge, holding very visible meetings with key groups and with international actors, ramping up normal government service provision and operations, and being seen to fix any damages from the clashes. While such activity is primarily superficial, it may well be enough to convince some residents that he is their best option and that he means well. However, the resignations of key ministers will weaken his government and are likely to further weaken its competency.
Furthermore, the perception that he retains UN and international support is vital for continued backing from the armed groups which still support him. If the internationals halted such engagement, his allies would likely worry that the UN would be about to shift its support elsewhere, and would scramble to distance themselves in order to protect their own interests under a potential new power arrangement. As it stands, the internationals are unlikely to remove their recognition of Dabaiba until a new unified government is agreed, or some other temporary authority or arrangement is agreed.
On the narrative side, Dabaiba is portraying himself in the role of ‘liberator’, uncovering and exposing the abuses committed by Ghinaywa and other militias and trying to remove their influence. The accusations levelled at Ghinaywa and others are undoubtedly true. However, the problem lies in the fact that similar accusations can be levelled at all the major armed groups in and around Tripoli, including those supporting the GNU (and nominally part of state structures), rather undermining Dabaiba’s claims.
As for the HoR and eastern authorities, they are using the instability in Tripoli as a trigger to justify pushing ahead with their efforts to appoint a new PM and government to replace him. However, while there may be more support for such a move now in Tripoli given the violence of the past week, the reality is that unless the UN and other internationals recognise whatever new government is appointed, it is likely to end up like the GNS, without access to Tripoli. As it stands, the UN wants any new government to be part of a wider, consensus based process with clear terms and limits. It may be that the HoR hopes to create pressure to fast track such a process. Given the current volatility and fluidity of the situation, it is possible that some sort of fast-tracked process or temporary work-around could be agreed. However, it remains very unlikely that Dabaiba will leave willingly. Although it is conceivable that a new PM could be appointed without international blessing and could take over Tripoli by force, such a move is likely to generate significant instability and violence. In the immediate term, Dabaiba is likely to remain in power but will come under growing pressure as efforts to remove him gather pace.
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GNU denies reports the US plans to resettle one million Palestinians in Libya
Incident: On 16 May, America’s NBC News reported that the Trump administration is working on a ‘plan’ to permanently relocate up to 1 million Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to Libya in exchange for the potential release of billions of dollars of frozen Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) assets held in the U.S. as an incentive. Prior to the leak, there were already discussions with Libyan and Israeli leadership. According to NBC News’ subsequent reports, the plan faces significant obstacles, including substantial costs, logistical challenges related to transportation (air, land, and sea), and the potential strain on Libya's fragile infrastructure, given its population size and the ongoing war and bifurcation of institutions. Arab nations have also been extremely critical of the idea.
NOC says oil production and operations are normal but the oil sector will be vulnerable to the instability in Tripoli; Shipping to Tripoli port impacted
Incident: The NOC has stressed this week that operations are normal with reports of moves to disrupt Zawiyya refinery unrealised so far, yet shipping to and from Tripoli port appears to have halted. On 16 May, National Oil Corporation (NOC) issued a statement confirming that ‘technical and operational processes at all oil fields and ports are proceeding normally and safely’. It also reiterated its ‘full commitment’ to working ‘in accordance with professional standards and a responsible national spirit to maintain the stability of the oil and gas sector and protect the national sovereign wealth of all Libyans’.
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GNU denies reports the US plans to resettle one million Palestinians in Libya
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