21 August 2024: Mishri’s position as HSC president gets legal backing
This week we look at Mishri securing judicial support as HSC head, as well as the legislative and physical attempts to wrestle control of the CBL away from Sadiq al-Kabir.
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Mishri’s position as HSC president gets legal backing as courts rule that ballot paper controversy should be resolved internally and session was valid
Incident: On 14 August acting UN Envoy to Libya Stephanie Koury said that she had spoken separately with both Khaled al-Mishri and Mohamed Takala about the 6 August voting dispute (for the High State Council [HSC] presidency), stressing ‘the need for a solution to maintain the unity of the HSC.’
On 19 August, the South Tripoli Court of First Instance ruled that the voting session on 6 August which saw Mishri elected as HSC president was valid. However, it is important to note it was not ruling on the validity of the compromised ballot paper. Three HSC members submitted a case against Mishri to the South Tripoli Court of First Instance claiming that the voting session on 6 August was attended by two people whose status as HSC members had previously been removed in accordance with the council’s bylaws (one because he became a minister in Osama Hammad’s government and another because he requested to resign). The plaintiffs argued this invalidated the session and any decisions taken in the session regarding the presidency. However, the court ruled in favour of Mishri, ruling that the HSC session was valid because any objections to certain members participating should have been raised at the time.
Later the same day, the Legal Department of the Supreme Judicial Council ruled on Mishri’s request (submitted on 13 August) to settle the legal controversy over the cancelled ballot paper, deciding that it is not competent to decide on this issue and noting that it is the internal regulations of the HSC which should govern the settlement of the dispute. The HSC noted that this ruling is in line with Mishri’s comments following the voting session on 6 August, which was settled by the HSC Legal Committee on 8 August in favour of Mishri (as the committee ruled that the ballot paper with Takala’s name on it had been voided and therefore did not count).
Comment: Since the HSC Legal Committee ruled that the controversial ballot paper was void, and that therefore Mishri won the election by 69 votes to Takala’s 68 votes, Mishri has been the de facto president of the HSC. Takala had pledged to ask the courts to rule on the ballot paper issue, but it seems he attempted to invalidate the session via another approach (presumably because he knew the court would likely rule as it did, that it was a matter for internal regulation.)
Units of the Special Deterrence Force (Rada) have enabled Mishri to enter the HSC HQ at the Radisson Blu Hotel in central Tripoli. Rada’s leadership has a fairly anti-Dabaiba stance, in line with Mishri’s own political positioning. However, so far, Mishri has barely left the Radisson since taking up office there for fear that his opponents/ Takala’s supporters would use this opportunity to retake the HSC HQ.
Significance: These judicial decisions effectively confirm Mishri’s position as HSC president and limit further judicial avenues through which Takala can contest the vote which saw Mishri elected. However, Mishri’s position remains fragile, especially against the wider backdrop of political instability and insecurity. It is likely that Takala will keep pushing for Mishri to stand down and/ or for another vote to be held. While Mishri is very unlikely to agree to this, it is possible that Takala and his allies will attempt to physically retake the HSC HQ in the Radisson or will attempt to set up a rival HSC session elsewhere. This could easily add to the other political, economic and security tensions and contribute to an escalation of the situation in Tripoli in the short term. Furthermore, if the situation is not resolved to the point that Takala accepts Mishri’s presidency, or some other solution is found, the HSC will struggle to complete the presidential elections (first and second deputies) and will struggle to hold formal sessions, limiting its role within the Libyan political and legislative landscape.
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The legislative battle for control of the CBL governorship intensifies amid a flurry of conflicting decisions and statements by the PC, CBL and HoR
Incident: This week, the HoR followed up on its decision to end the terms of the GNU and PC by heading off attempts by PM Dabaiba and PC head Menfi to use previous HoR decisions related to the CBL governorship to replace Kabir.
On 15 August, the HoR Speaker Aqeela Saleh issued HoR Presidency Decision No.12 of 2024 suspending HoR Resolution No.3 of 2018 under which Muhammed al-Shukri was appointed Governor of the CBL due to the period of his assignment lapsing (a term is nominally 5 years) and Shukri’s failure to carry out his duties from the date of the decision being issued. It also confirmed the continuation of the implementation of the HoR Presidency Decision No.25 of 2023 which assigned Sadiq al-Kabir as CBL Governor and Marei al-Barassi as his Deputy Governor.
Tensions mount among armed groups in Tripoli over CBL but truce in place for now; Brief kidnap of CBL IT director leads CBL to temporarily halt operations
Incident: On 18 August, in the morning, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) issued a statement in which it denounced the ‘kidnapping of the Director of the Information Technology Department, Musab Emsallem, by an unknown party in front of his house this Sunday morning at 9 am. and the threat of kidnapping by some other officials.’ The CBL said it rejects the ‘demagogic methods practiced by some parties outside the framework of the law which threatens the safety of its employees and the continuation of the banking sector’s work’. The CBL confirmed the suspension of all the bank’s work, departments and systems until Emsalim is released.
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The legislative battle for control of the CBL governorship intensifies amid a flurry of conflicting decisions and statements by the PC, CBL and HoR
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