18 June 2025: PC oversees new security arrangements in Tripoli
This week we look at new security arrangements in Tripoli, as well as political activity in the lead up to the Berlin meeting and the NOC recording a 12-year high for oil output in May.
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Situation in Tripoli de-escalates for now as PC issues new security arrangements and bans armed manifestations and mobilisations in Tripoli
Incident: This week, the Presidential Council (PC) ramped up efforts to sustain the ceasefire, reduce military movements in the capital and restructure security forces.
On 10 June, upon returning from a UN summit in France, PC head Muhammed al-Menfi met with the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee in Tripoli to discuss the current security situation. Al-Menfi emphasized the need for full compliance with ceasefire decisions. He vowed to decisively address all violations, directly escalating them to his office for immediate action against offenders to uphold the rule of law and prevent a return to chaos. During this meeting, also attended by various other military leaders, al-Menfi highlighted the necessity of close cooperation with UNSMIL for rigorous implementation of ceasefire terms.
On 11 June, al-Menfi held a series of meetings with the Chief of Staff, his deputy, and a number of military leaders, as well as the commanders of the newly formed Disengagement Force and members of the temporary security arrangements committee. It was agreed that all forces and military vehicles from both sides would return to their barracks that evening at 8 pm local time under the supervision of the Disengagement Force formed by the General Staff. A joint committee was also formed to monitor any violations of the agreement and take action against any force that violates it.
Al-Menfi emphasized the importance of discipline and adherence to orders, urging all military formations to support the Disengagement Force in its assigned tasks. This force consists mainly of Libyan Army units, Border Guards and the Misrata-led Reserve Division of the Counterterrorism Force. It was agreed that meetings will resume and efforts will intensify until all armed elements are evacuated from Tripoli and the regular police and military forces can perform their duties to maintain security and stability.
The PC’s efforts were largely successful, with the rival armed groups returning to their bases and no major escalations occurring.
The return of forces from both sides to their barracks – including the Special Deterrence Forces (Rada) on one side and the 444 Brigade, the (Zintani) Public Security Force and the (Misratan) 111th Brigade took place without major incidents during the evening of 11 June.
The same evening, Menfi issued Decision No.36 of 2025 banning all armed manifestations in Tripoli and prohibiting military movements within the city. Security enforcement is now solely entrusted to the Tripoli Security Directorate and the Military Police.
On 12 June, al-Menfi issued Decision No.37 of 2025 to form a joint military security force called the ‘Tripoli Security Directorate Support Force’ to secure the capital. The force will consist of six military and security agencies (the 444 Brigade, West Coast Military District, Rada, 52nd Infantry Brigade, Security Directorate Support Agency, and Public Security Agency). Each of them will contribute five lightly armed vehicles, four officers, and 80 security personnel. The Tripoli Security Director will be in charge of the joint force, and all its members will be under his direct supervision. The force will operate for three months and will be based opposite the Abu al-Layla Tower on the seafront. The Ministry of Defense will provide everything the force needs to carry out its work, including food, equipment, and supplies.
Despite renewed calls for protests against the GNU, this week’s Friday protests were relatively small.
The Souq al-Jumaa Movement and the Social Councils of Souq al-Jumaa and of the Four districts called again for mass protests on the coming Friday 13 May. They supported the PC taking temporary control until a clear roadmap was established and urged the UN mission to accelerate political negotiations.
On 13 June in the evening, only a couple of hundred protesters gathered on Algeria Square and later on Martyr’s Square, demanding the resignation of the PM.
On 16 June, the Souq al-Jumaa Movement affirmed after a meeting its commitment to overthrow the Dabaiba government and stressed the importance of organizing its ranks for the next phase.
Comment: Menfi’s new security decisions and restructuring come after a month of instability and inter-militia conflict within Tripoli, the crux of which is pro-Dabaiba groups trying to remove Rada from the capital, and Rada resisting. Although Menfi created the temporary security arrangements committee on 4 June and included Rada as one of the members, tensions between Rada and pro-Dabaiba groups had escalated again on 9 and 10 June after the Zintani-led Public Security Force crossed the ceasefire lines. This provoked a response from Rada and resulted in Rada expanding its footprint in central Tripoli.
Dabaiba is maintaining his narrative of combatting militias in Tripoli. Last week, criminal proceedings were initiated by the Attorney General against 141 members of the Public Security Force, the Stability Support Agency (SSA), and other security agencies for offenses including murder, torture, kidnapping, and arbitrary detention. Investigations are also underway into armed clashes, looting and thefts in Tripoli, with ten arrest warrants issued so far.
Significance: Although the security situation in Tripoli has become more stable over the last few days, the situation remains tense and the underlying dynamics and rivalries have not been resolved. For now, armed groups have withdrawn to their key bases but little has fundamentally changed – Rada still controls Mitiga and will not give it up, while Dabaiba still wants to expand his control over Mitiga and see Rada neutralised. Rada likely agreed to the new arrangements as refusing to accede to them would have given Dabaiba a clear pretext for an assault. Furthermore, these arrangements do not significantly undermine Rada’s strategic or territorial position in Tripoli.
Ahead of the upcoming Berlin meeting on 20 June, Dabaiba probably wanted to demonstrate that he is working to curtail the influence of the militias but in a way that avoids an escalation of conflict. This will make it harder for the internationals to condemn him or remove their support for him, especially if there is no obvious alternative. However, it remains likely that fresh mobilisations and inter-militia conflict will break out again at some point soon in the capital. As such, if and when there are violations of the agreement and armed groups mobilise within the city (which seems very likely at some point in the coming days and weeks), it remains unclear whether the new arrangements will be sufficient to mediate a resolution without violence escalating.
Furthermore, although Dabaiba has not launched an all-out assault against Rada’s positions in Mitiga, and may be unlikely to do so prior to the Berlin meeting, he undoubtedly still wants to remove Rada at some point soon. Any direct assault on Rada is likely to lead to a major escalation of conflict in Tripoli, especially if the fighting lasts several days – in this case, it is more likely to draw in forces from outside Tripoli, escalating the conflict further.
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International actors gear up for the Berlin meeting amid calls for a new government; UNSMIL launches a poll on the political roadmap
Incident: Last week, UNSMIL launched an online poll on the four roadmap options outlined by the Advisory Committee to gauge the view of Libyans, while also expanding in-person consultations with key communities. On 10 June, the Special Representatives to the UN Secretary-General for Libya (SRSG) Hanna Tetteh launched a public online poll to gather feedback on the proposals presented by the Advisory Committee (AC) for moving Libya toward elections. The poll is anonymous but requires participants to provide basic information around age, sex, region, cultural background and employment status. The poll was welcomed by the EU and some other international actors.
International data shows crude output hitting 12-year high in May despite wider instability and NOC struggles to secure funding
Incident: On 10 June, the Platts OPEC+ Survey from S&P Global Commodity Insights showed that Libyan oil output edged up to a new 12-year high of 1.23 million bpd in May, with crude output rising 30,000bpd month over month. Increased output in May was reflected in Libya's crude exports, which hit a multi-year high of 1.26 million bpd. Italy was the biggest purchaser of Libya's light sweet crudes in the month, followed by France, the US and China.
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International actors gear up for the Berlin meeting amid calls for a new government; UNSMIL launches a poll on the political roadmap
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