15 May 2024: Russia plays both sides in Libya
This week's free newsletter looks at Moscow's efforts to secure support from both eastern and western Libya, so its military build-up can continue unhindered.
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Russia is deepening its relations with both eastern and western Libya, as delegations from both regions visit Moscow
Incident: Russia is deepening its military, political and economic ties with eastern Libya. On 7 May, the Russian Special Envoy for MENA and Africa, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Bogdanov, received the Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Security Units (and son of Khalifa Haftar), Khaled Haftar, in Moscow for talks on the situation in Libya and bilateral cooperation. The talks focused on the task of uniting all national, political and regional forces in order to guarantee Libya's unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The main purpose of Khaled Haftar’s visit to Moscow was to discuss training support for the LNA's ground forces, especially for Khaled’s own Security Units.
On 9 May, in an interview with the Russian Sputnik News Agency, the General Manager of the Development & Reconstruction Fund (and another of Haftar’s sons), Belqasim Haftar, announced a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction and development of all Libyan cities. He emphasized that Libya welcomes the participation of Russian companies in the reconstruction and further development of Libya.
On 12 May, the Russian ambassador to Libya Aydar Aganin emphasized that the Russian military presence in Libya is in coordination with the General Command of the LNA and the House of Representatives (HoR). According to him, everything that happens in Libya by the Russian side is done in coordination with official Libyan authorities, whether in the East or West.
Russia is also ramping up its engagement with western Libya. On 13 May, a delegation led by Presidential Council Deputy Abdullah al-Lafi, including acting Government of National Unity (GNU) Minister of Foreign Affairs al-Taher al-Baour and Libyan Army CoS Muhammed al-Haddad, was received in Moscow by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov. During the meeting, Lavrov emphasized his country's commitment to the unity and stability of Libya, reiterating Moscow’s intentions to open a consulate in Benghazi.
Al-Lafi emphasized the importance of bilateral relations between Libya and Russia and the importance of partnership in a number of specific areas. He emphasized the importance of a positive and constructive role by Russia in favour of the stability of Libya and the importance of Russian support to the work of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC). The two sides agreed to activate several joint committees, strengthen bilateral relations and work on the return of Russian companies to Libya, especially in the hydrocarbon industry and infrastructure sector.
Comment: Although Russia long provided military support and training to the LNA and eastern authorities – first covertly through the Wagner Group and now openly through Moscow’s Africa Corps – it has also worked hard to maintain amicable ties to authorities in western Libya. The Russian embassy in Tripoli was reopened in February 2024 and Aganin meets frequently with Tripoli officials. Although Turkish forces retain a strong presence in western Libya in counter balance to the Russian presence in eastern Libya (based on the 2020 ceasefire which ended the LNA’s failed attempt to take over Tripoli), neither side wants a major conflict in Libya.
In recent months, Russia has begun to overtly consolidate its presence in eastern Libya, with several visits by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov to Benghazi and the arrival to Tubruq in the last two months of several ship loads of Russian military equipment, arms and men. Moscow is using Libya as a launching pad to transfer arms and men to the Sahel region where it is attempting (with some success) to expand its presence, at the expense of Western nations, notably the US and France.
Significance: Russia is attempting – and appears to be succeeding – in expanding its political, economic and military relations with Libyan authorities from across the country. For the East, the relationship with Russia provides the LNA with much-needed military support and training, while allowing Russia vital access to use Libya as a launching pad for its expansion into the Sahel and wider African region. Russia is becoming increasingly important for the eastern authorities from an economic point of view. While most Western countries are still reluctant to make contact with Eastern authorities and do business in the East, Moscow is trying to fill the gap. For the West, Russia is also an important political and economic partner. In addition, Moscow is being careful to engage with guests from Tripoli in a way that recognises their international status, usually rolling out more senior officials to meet with Tripoli delegations compared with Benghazi delegations, and ensuring the Tripoli embassy was reopened prior to the Benghazi consulate.
This is sending a clear message to the US and Western countries that there is no major opposition to Moscow’s build up of force from the Libyan side, even in the western region. Of course, were Russian forces to engage in a military manoeuvre or offensive against the western region or positions held by GNU-aligned forces then this would undoubtedly change – but there are no signs that this is Moscow’s intention, nor the LNA’s. In addition, this recent engagement (following the collapse of the UN political process) suggests that Moscow may be trying to position itself as a political mediator and interlocutor in Libya capable of engaging in a trusted way with all Libyan parties. This would allow Moscow to become even more assertive in Libya and the wider region, securing support (or at least avoiding active opposition) from any new government. Meanwhile, the US, EU and other Western nations seem to be unable or unwilling to take meaningful action to counter Russia’s growing presence, despite their concerns about the evolving situation.
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