14 May 2025: Ghinaywa killed sparking clashes and SSA defeat at hands of pro-Dabaiba militias
This week we look at SSA commander Ghinaywa's assassination and subsequent clashes in capital, as well as reports the LIA is discussing unfreezing US assets and the CBL's latest figures.
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Tensions between Misrata and SSA in Khoms and Tripoli escalate; Ghinaywa killed sparking clashes and SSA defeat at hands of pro-Dabaiba militias
Incident: An attack by the Misrata-led Joint Operations Force against the Stability Support Agency (SSA) in Khoms early in the week increased tensions between the SSA and Misratan armed groups in Tripoli and Khoms.
Various Tripoli, Misratan and other western region groups began to mobilise in and around the capital throughout the week in anticipation of an escalation of fighting, with Abdul Ghani al-Kikli aka Ghinaywa, the commander of the SSA, emerging as the main target for pro-Dabaiba groups. There were a few minor scuffles.
On 12 May, UNSMIL called for calm in response to reports of military mobilization in the greater Tripoli region and demanded to solve disputes through dialogue. The U.S. Embassy and several other embassies also called urgently for de-escalation.
The situation escalated on the evening of 12 May when SSA commander Ghinaywa and a number of his bodyguards were killed at Camp Tekbali, the HQ of the 444 Brigade in Tripoli.
Allegedly, Ghinaywa was at the HQ of his opponents in Khaled al-Furjan in southern Tripoli for an official meeting after sunset prayers. He was escorted by ten bodyguards. Other participants to the meeting were Military Intelligence Director (and Commander of the 444 Brigade) Mahmoud Hamza, Deputy Minister of Defense Abdussalam Zoubi, MoI Emad Trabelsi and his brother Abdullah Trabelsi aka al-Farawila, commander of the Public Security Force, and a number of Misrata militia leaders. The meeting allegedly escalated and developed into an armed clash. Other sources indicate that the intention was always to kill Ghinaywa, having lured him to the meeting.
In addition to Ghinaywa and his bodyguards, three attendees from Misrata were killed. Several other participants were wounded.
Several civilian airplanes were flown from Mitiga airport to Misrata to protect them from any fighting in the capital. The University of Tripoli announced the suspension of studies, exams and administrative work until further notice. GECOL said that electricity was cut off in several areas of the capital due to the clashes.
The Ministry of the Interior called on all citizens in the Tripoli area to stay in their homes in order to preserve their safety. The Ambulance and Emergency Service issued urgent directives to raise readiness inside Tripoli, and called on its surrounding branches to support the Service in the city.
After Ghinaywa’s death, pro-Dabaiba forces moved to secure the SSA stronghold of Abu Salim and it seems the SSA and its allies were largely routed from the capital.
Later on in the evening of 12 May, some heavy fighting started in the areas of Ain Zara and Salahadeen as well as in Addrebe between the SSA and militias from Misrata and the 444 Brigade. After a brief fight, the 111th Brigade and the 444 Brigade occupied the SSA HQ in the Plateau Project area. Before midnight, the 111th Brigade was advancing into Abu Salim without facing much resistance. A number of SSA leaders and fighters attempted to escape towards Zawiyya. Rada reinforced its troops protecting Mitiga airport.
Overnight from 12 to 13 May, the Government of National Unity (GNU) MoD said that it has control over the entire Abu Salim region and that ‘the military operation has ended successfully’. It confirmed it has given its instructions to ‘complete its plan in the region to ensure sustained security and stability’. The Emergency Medicine and Support Center announced the recovery of six bodies from the sites of the clashes.
Internationals and various Libyan political actors called for calm while the GNU said it had secured the city.
UNSMIL issued a statement late on 12 May saying it is ‘alarmed by the unfolding security situation in Tripoli, with intense fighting with heavy weaponry in densely populated civilian areas. The Mission calls on all parties to immediately cease fighting and restore calm, and reminds all parties of their obligations to protect civilians at all times. Attacks on civilians and civilian objects may amount to war crimes. UNSMIL fully supports the efforts of elders and community leaders to de-escalate the situation.’ This was echoed by several other international actors.
Several House of Representatives (HoR) members called for calm and expressed concern over the military escalation in Tripoli, calling for the formation of a competent unified government. The High State Council (HSC) under Khaled al-Mishri also called for calm. At the time of writing on 13 May, the Presidential Council (PC) had not issued a formal statement on the situation, despite being the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army.
On 13 May, the GNU Ministry of Interior said it is ‘implementing an intensive security operation in the neighbourhoods and streets of Abu Salim, as part of a plan aimed at securing the area and promoting stability.’ It instructed citizens to stay away from sites and military gatherings, and not to hinder the movements of security patrols, stressing that it will deal with any attempts to rob or violate public security with ‘all strength’.
Meanwhile, PM Dabaiba saluted the MoI and MoD and their forces ‘for their significant accomplishment in establishing security and imposing state authority in the capital’. He said the operation ‘confirms that the regular institutions are capable of protecting the homeland and preserving the dignity of citizens’ and that it ‘constitutes a decisive step toward eliminating irregular groups’.
As of 13 May in the afternoon, the fighting had largely halted but there were reports of looting of goods, shops, cars and houses, as well as some fires being set.
UPDATE: Overnight from 13 to 14 May, the 444 Brigade moved on Rada in Souq al-Jumaa in eastern Tripoli, but did not achieve an easy victory this time. Instead, there were very heavy clashes and mobilisations. Although a ceasefire was in place in the afternoon on 14 May, a major escalation of conflict in Tripoli is now likely.
Comment: Tensions have been building in and around Tripoli for several weeks, if not months. It seems Abdul Hameed Dabaiba and his security advisor Ibrahim Dabaiba had become increasingly nervous about losing their position and power amid efforts to move the UN process forward and to appoint a new government. As it stood, Dabaiba could count for support on Deputy MoD Zoubi’s (Misrata) 111th Brigade forces, the 444 Brigade under Mahmoud Hamza, as well as GNU MoI Trabelsi (from Zintan) and the Zintani forces under the control of him and his brother (in western Tripoli) and the Misratan Joint Force. The other two main forces in Tripoli were the SSA under Ghinaywa based in Abu Salim – the Abu Salim Central Security Force is (or was) the core force of Ghinaywa and belongs to the SSA – and Rada led by Abdurraof Kara based in Mitiga in Souq al-Jumaa in eastern Tripoli.
Relations between Dabaiba and Kara had been strained for sometime, and in recent weeks it had seemed that the pro-Dabaiba groups were mobilising to remove Rada (and the Judicial Police) from Mitiga. However, there was a strong response from Souq al-Jumaa as well as some internationals, amid concerns that the removal of Rada could result in Tripoli’s only functioning airport being disrupted or destroyed and the many terror suspects being detained by Rada being released. At this point, it seems the focus shifted to removing Ghinaywa instead.
Ghinaywa was not only a powerful leader of militias affiliated with the MoI, but also one of the most feared criminal kingpins in the greater Tripoli area. On the other side, many people in the Abu Salim area, especially those with roots in Kikla, considered him their protector. He had previously been a core supporter of the GNU and has benefitted significantly from his close ties to Dabaiba in recent years by expanding his influence and control over key economic and administrative institutions within the Libyan state, physically controlling many institutions as well as successfully appointing his loyalists in key leadership positions.
Significance: The killing of Ghinaywa and the subsequent (but ongoing) move to neutralise the SSA will have a profound impact on power dynamics, politics and security in and around the capital. The swiftness with which the pro-Dabaiba forces moved to take control of Abu Salim and mop up other SSA figures highlights that this was an opportunity which they were poised to take. It can be expected that the enemies of the SSA, especially of the Abu Salim Central Security Force, will seek to eliminate the influence of these forces and to disband them in the immediate term. Some more fighting, especially around the bases of the SSA in Abu Salim, in southern and southwestern Tripoli is likely. The SSA’s previous territory is likely to be split up between the 444 Brigade and 111 Brigade, among others, potentially creating fresh inter-militia tensions around who secures where.
It is also possible that the pro-Dabaiba forces will want to build on their momentum and try to remove Rada from Mitiga. If this happens, further escalation is very likely, with all out war in central Tripoli likely and mobilisations from Misrata, Zintan and Zawiyya to the city, as well as likely mobilisations by the LNA to Sirte and Jufra. Even if Rada is not targeted or if it tries to restrengthen its ties to the Dabaiba government as a reliable security partner, the reality is that without the SSA, the majority of armed groups left in Tripoli are from Misrata or Zintan. This is likely to stoke some anger and frustration among many Tripoli residents, especially if additional Misratan forces are deployed to the capital. In the immediate term, it is likely the situation in Tripoli will calm down somewhat, but the risk of renewed escalation and violence remains high and the broader shifts in power dynamics which are likely to follow will undoubtedly have significant reverberations for the coming period.
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LIA assets in the US become focus of power struggle as LIA denies it is discussing sharing frozen assets with Trump
Incident: On 8 May, reports circulated on international media that the GNU and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) have held talks with the US about sharing billions of dollars in frozen Libyan state assets if the Trump administration helps unlock those funds in the US – some USD 30 billion which have been frozen since the 2011 Revolution in Libya. The following day, the LIA issued a statement denying those rumours and emphasising that the reports circulated were ‘not based on reliable sources or official reports issued by the relevant authorities’.
CBL reports drop in foreign currency expenditure in April, stresses need for oil revenues to be transferred regularly
Incident: On 12 May, the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) issued its latest statement on national expenditure and income from 1 January to 30 April 2025. The total income was LYD 37.693 billion, with LYD 30.6 billion from oil sales, LYD 6.5 billion from oil royalties, and LYD 45 million from telecommunications revenue, among others. Total expenditures was LYD 31.495 billion, with 24.3 billion on Chapter 1 (Salaries), 595 million on Chapter 2 (Operations), and LYD 6.6 billion on Chapter 4 (Subsidies). No expenses were recorded for Chapter 3 (Development) or Chapter 5 (Emergencies). On foreign exchange, USD 11.871 billion has been used in total in the reporting period, the majority via Letters of Credit or for personal purposes. Total oil revenues and royalties for the hydrocarbons sector were USD 7.3 billion, giving a deficit of USD 4.525 billion.
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LIA assets in the US become focus of power struggle as LIA denies it is discussing sharing frozen assets with Trump
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