13 November 2024: What might the impact of Trump’s election be on Libya?

This week we look at the impact of Trump's election on Libya, renewed tensions between Zintan and the GNU, and calls from the NOC for more funding.

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Political disengagement, empowerment of Russia, and a drop in oil prices: what might the impact of Trump’s election be on Libya?

Incident: Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the 2024 US Presidential elections held on 5 November and his inauguration in January 2025 is likely to have far-reaching effects on American foreign policy, with ripple effects surely to be felt in Libya. The Libya file was already very low on the list of American priorities under the presidency of Joe Biden. The diplomatic aspects of the file are largely seen in the prism of relations with the Gulf States and with Europe over the migration issues, while the military aspects of the file are seen through the prism of containing Russia.

Viewing Libya through the lens of Gulfi relations and the EU migration dossier is likely to continue, with the US potentially reducing its engagement even further and delegating the role of coordinating the international community to Gulf and EU allies. The Trump administration will likely actively encourage European nations such as Italy and France to try to take on a greater role in leading Western policy-making in Libya, though it is unclear whether they would be able to take on such a mantel, especially given tensions within Europe. It could also give US regional allies such as the UAE and Egypt greater sway in the country.

During Trump’s first presidency, his administration was seen to be largely favourable to Khalifa Haftar increasing his influence due to close ties between members of Trump’s outer circle (especially Walid Phares) and that of the Haftar family. These ties, and Trump’s closeness with the Emiratis and Saudis, were largely seen as the logic behind his lack of intervention to prevent (or even possible greenlighting) of Haftar’s assault on Tripoli in April 2019. In addition, the received wisdom is that Trump admires, and seeks to emulate, ‘strongmen’ autocrats, of which Khalifa Haftar (and increasingly his sons) are prime examples.

This was at a time when most other Western countries, other than France, were not overtly engaging with the Haftars – however, these days, high-ranking diplomats and politicians from across the Western world regularly travel to Benghazi to meet with Khalifa Haftar and his sons. It may be that under a second Trump presidency, the Haftar family will be further empowered, shifting the balance of power even further in their favour and allowing them greater access to the levers and coffers of the Libyan state. It is important to note that this appears to be the way the wind is blowing anyway, regardless of a Trump presidency.

There is likely to be a shift in US relations with Russia under Trump, which could directly impact Libya. At present, the US defense establishment mainly sees Libya through the lens of countering Russia’s growing presence (economically and militarily) in the country, though its strategy for addressing this issue is to seek to entice the Haftar family away from Moscow by wooing them with regular meetings, visits to the US and participation in joint military training exercises – it has been unwilling to use any ‘sticks’ such as sanctions to persuade Khalifa Haftar or his sons to cut ties with Moscow. Under Trump, this focus on countering Russia’s influence in Africa is likely to decline, giving Moscow and its mercenaries on the ground an even freer hand in Libya and the wider region. Conversely, Trump may be more willing to counter the deepening ties between China and Libya, in particular the growing economic ties between China and the Haftar family.

At the level of the UN Security Council, improved relations between the US and Russia under Trump could mean that Moscow is more willing to approve a Western-supported Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Libya and/ or may be less disruptive to efforts to extend the UNSMIL mandate in the coming period. However, given such moves are likely to be agreed only the basis of concessions on other areas of Russia involvement in Libya, the net effect on the UN’s ability to mediate a political solution in Libya may not be notable.

In economic terms, Trump’s pledge to increase US oil and gas production could lead to increased volumes of hydrocarbons on the global market resulting in a decline in prices. Given Libya’s reliance on oil revenues, this might limit Libya’s spending power and economic growth and is likely to increase the existing hard currency deficit. This in turn could increase the politicisation and political division over key economic institutions and over mechanisms for disbursing funds, increasing economic instability more broadly.

Another factor is that the US is one of the main international actors pushing for economic reform and consensus around a budget (albeit with little success on the latter to date). While a change in the Presidency does not necessarily mean that there will be noticeable changes on diplomatic procedures and specific issues of engagement such as the budget, policies and negotiations around such topics could become more transactional and open to lobbying from competing Libyan actors (and their allies).

An interesting element in shaping US-Libya relations is the appointment of Susie Wiles as Trump’s Chief of Staff given she was for the last two year the co-chair of Mercury Public Affairs’s DC and Florida offices. Mercury is one of the largest lobbying firms in the US which in the past represented the government of Fayez al-Serraj, had deep ties with Sadiq al-Kabir, and currently represents Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC). For instance, in June 2024, Mercury sent a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken on the NOC’s behalf, urging him to ‘protect the independence of the NOC and its Chairman,’ claiming his ‘leadership may be in jeopardy’ due to ‘continuing pressures’ from both internal and external sources. While the NOC and its leadership is in a state of flux at present, this link to one of the most powerful people in Trump’s presidency could help the NOC to leverage influence in Washington and is likely to mean that Libya won’t fall entirely off the agenda as Libyan actors understand how to reach the new crop of decision makers and may also know how to engage in pay-to-play to get their issues attended too.

Significance: It is too early to say definitively what the direct impact of the second Trump presidency will be on Libya, in part because Libya will be affected by the overarching global economic and geopolitical shifts that the whole world is likely to experience as Trump (presumably) attempts to implement his pledges such as increasing oil production, introducing tariffs, cracking down on illegal immigration and appeasing Russia. However, it is likely that the received wisdom among Libyan actors will be that a Trump presidency is likely to put the Haftar family in a stronger position politically (due to historic ties), militarily (with less pressure to disentangle from Moscow) and economically (with potentially less political capital behind efforts to agree a unified budget or similar mechanism). Although the political process towards democratic elections is currently dead in the water, such changes could sink it forever and could usher in a ‘Qadhafi 2.0’ scenario under the rule of the Haftar family. Simultaneously, Libyan actors (not only the Haftars but also institution heads) will be able to wage a transactional influence campaign inside Washington and via their Emirati and Saudi backers to sway Trump policy. A possible silver lining could be that Qatar and Turkey might wish to consent to an Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian led approach to the international aspects of the Libya file in exchange for other favours from the ascendant powers in the new Trump orbit.

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Tensions between Zintan and the GNU rise as Zintan threatens to shut Riyana valve over kidnap of intelligence official; Clashes in Hamada between the 444 Brigade and PFG reignite

Incident: Tensions between Zintan and the Tripoli authorities have flared up again this week over the kidnapping of a Zintani intelligence official in the capital. On 6 November, Brigadier General Mustafa al-Wahishi, head of the Central Security Department of the Libyan Intelligence Service (LIS), disappeared in Tripoli on the way home from his office in Assabaa (south of Souq al-Jumaa). Al-Wahishi hails from Zintan. Colleagues of al-Wahishi at the LIS condemned the incident, called it a kidnapping and stressed that justice will reach everyone involved in this crime.

Oil Minister confirms new exploration round soon; NOC seeks funding to increase production despite concerns over how extraordinary budget was spent

Incident: Libya confirms plans for a new exploration round in the coming months as production remains high and maintenance works continue. On 5 November, the head of the GNU Ministry of Oil and Gas (MOOG), Khalifa Abdul Sadiq, gave an interview to Bloomberg in which he confirmed Libya’s intention to conduct a new round of bidding for oil and natural gas exploration, either at the end of this year or early 2025. He stressed that plans are in place to implement oil projects worth USD 17 billion, aiming to raise oil production to 1.7 million bpd by the end of 2027, and to 2 million bpd by 2028.

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Tensions between Zintan and the GNU rise as Zintan threatens to shut Riyana valve over kidnap of intelligence official; Clashes in Hamada between the 444 Brigade and PFG reignite